A b s t r a c t . Thc block cipher DESX is tiefined by D E S X k . k l . k a (~) = k2 a) DESk(51 @ P ) , where cfi denotes bitwise exclusive-or. This construction was first suggested by R.on Rivest as a computationally-cheap way to protect DES against exhaustive key-search attacks. This paper proves, in a formal model, that the DESX coIistruction is sound. We show that, when F is an idealized block cipher, FXk.kl.ka(x) = 52 cfi Fb(5l @ x) is substantially more resistant to key search thaii is F . Iri fact, our analysis says that FX has an effective key length of at least IE. + TI -1 -lg m bits, where IF, is t,he key length of F , n is the block Icngth, arid 'rrL bounds the numbpr of ( P , F X K ( P ) ) pairs the adversary can obtain.
Introduction
The susceptibility of DES to exhaustive key search has been a concern and a complaint sirice the cipher wa.s first madc public; see, for example, [6] . Careful analysis by Wiener [15] indicates that, the problem has now escalated to t,he point that for $1 million onc could build a DES key search engine which, given a (plaintext, ciphertext,) pair, would rccovcr the kcy in about 3.5 expected hours.
Many people have suggested overcoming the tlireat of exhaustive key search by using DES in some appropriate way. One approach is to construct a DESbased block cipher which employs a longer key. Triple DES (typically in "EDE mode") is the best-known algorithm in this vein. It seems to be quite secure, hit efficiency considerations make t,riple DES a, rather painful way t o solve the exhaustive key-search problem. This paper analyses a Iniich cheaper alternative.
We recall an e1ega.nt suggestion of Ron Itivest [ll] . He proposes an extension of DES, called DESX, defined in the following simple manner: significantly, the computational cost has hardly been increased over ordinary DES. Yet, somehow, DESX seems 110 longer susceptible to brute-force attacks of anything near 256 time.
It is unintuitive that one should be a.ble t,o substantially increase the difficulty of key search by something as simple as a couple of X0R.s. Yet working with the DESX definition for a while will convince the reader that undoing their effect is not so easy.
Does the "DESX trick" really work to improve the strength of DES against exhaustive key search? This papcr will give a strong positive result showing th;t.t, it does.
Our model
Key-search strategies disregard the algebraic or cryptanalytic specifics of a cipher and treat it as a black-box transformation, instead. Key-search strategies can be quite sophisticated; recent, work by [14] is an example. We want a model generous enough to permit sophisticated key-search strategies, but, restricted enough to permit only strategies which should be regarded as key search. We a.ccomplish this as follows.
Let K be the key length for a block cipher and let 'rb be its block length. We model an ideal block cipher with these parameters as a random map F : {0,1}" x {0,1)" + ( 0 , l ) " subject to the constraint that, for every key k E (0, l}", F ( k , .) is a permutation on (0, A key-search adversary is an algorithm which is given the following two oracles: one which, on input ( k ,~) , returns F ( k , x ) ; and one which, on input ( k , y), returns F-' ( k , y). T h r last expression names the unique point x such that F ( k , s ) = y.
A key-search adversary tries to perform some cryptanalytic task which depends on F . She can perform complicated and subtle computations, use as much time or space as she sees fit, but her only access to F is via the F/F-' oracles. We look at the adversary's rate of success in performing her cryptanalytic task as a fiinctiori of the amount, of computation she performs.
To apply t,he above to DESX, we begin by gencralizing the DESX construction. Given any block cipher F we can define FX : (0,
For both F and FX we shall sometimes write their first argument, (the kev) as a subscript, F k ( z ) and FXK(X),
To investigate the strength of FX against, key search we consider a keysearch adversary A with oracles for F and F-', and determine how well A can play the following "FX-or-7r?" game: given one of two types of "encryption oracles" -an oracle which computes FXr<(.), for K a random string of length K, + 271, or else an oracle which computes T ( . ) , for T ( . ) : (0, l}" + (0, a random permutatioii-guess which type of encryption oracle you have. The FX construction "works" if the resoiirces which are necessary to do a good job in winning the above game &I-e substantially greater than the resources which are sufficient to break F . 
Our main result

Related work
Even and Mansour [7] construct, a block cipher PX : {0,1}2"
Clearly this is a special case of the FX construction, where K, = 0. Whilc their motivation for looking at PX was quite different from our reasons to investigate FX, our model and methods are, in fact, quite similar.
Our main result can be seen as a natural extension of their work. The modeling of a block cipher by a family of random permutations has its roots in [13] .
Ron Rivest, had invented DESX by May of 1984, but the scheme was never described in any conference or journal paper 1111. It was implemented within products of RSA Data Security, In(:., and it is described in the documentation for these products [12] . DESX has also been described at conferences organized by RSA DSI, including [16] .
Encryption methods similar to DESX have been invented independently.
Blaze [3] describes a DES mode of operation in which the ith block of plaintext, zi, is ericrypt,ed using 112-bit key k.kl 
Discussion
UNDERSTANDING OUR. RESULT. It may be hard to understand the ramifications of our main theorem, thinking it means more or less than it does. Let us try to clarify one important point right away. DES, of course, is not a family of random permutations, and we can not conclude from our theorem that there does not exist, a reasonable machine M which breaks DESX in say, 260 steps, given just a handful of (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs. What, we can say is that, such a machine would have to exploit structural properties of DES; it couldn't get away with treating DES as a black-box transformation. This contrasts with the sort of machines which have been suggested in the past for doing brute-force attack: they do treat the underlying cipher as a black-box transformation.
We note that while remarkable theoretical progress has been made on the linear and differential cryptanalysis of DES (see [2, lo] ), thus far these attacks require an impractically large number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs. To date, the only published practical attacks against DES remain of the key-search variety. The DESX construction was not intended to improve the strength of DES against differential or linear attack, or any other attack which exploits structural properties of DES.
gorithmically trivial it can be to get, extra bits of strength against exhaustive key-search attack. The impact, of these extra bits can be especially dramatic when the key length of the block cipher had been intentionally made short. Consider, say, a block cipher F with a 40-bit key and a 64-bit plaintext. (Some products using such block ciphers has been granted U S . export approval.) With these parameters, our results guarantee an effective key length (with respect to exhaustive key search) of at least 40 + 64 -1 -lg m = 103 -1g m bits. Under the reasonable assumption that m < 230, say, the 40-bit block cipher has been modified, with two XORs, to a new block cipher which needs at least 273-time for key exhaustive key search.
Allowing weak cryptography to be exported and strong cryptography not to be is a policy which can only make sense when it is impractical, for the given system, to replace the weak mechanism by a strong one. Our results indicate that this impracticality must cover algorithmic changes which are part,icularly trivial.
ON EXPORT CONTROJS TIED TO KEY J,ENG'I'H. Our rcsults indicate how al-
O u t l i n e of the paper
In Section 2 we define some basic: notation and define what comprises a successful attack in our iriodel. In Section 3 we s t a k and prove our main theorem on the security of the DESX construction. Section 4 is a discussion. Section 5 demonstrates t,hat the analysis underlying our main result is tight. In Section 6 we give some conclusions and open questions.
Preliminaries
Let, F : (0, l}" x ( 0 , l ) " -+ (0, l}" be ii block cipher. This means that for every
) is a permutation on {U, l},. We interchangeably write Fk(x) and F ( k , z).
Given a block cipher F as above, the block cipher F -: (0, l}k x (0, l}" + {O,l}% is defined from F by F -' ( k , v ) being the unique point x such that F ( k ) x) = y. We interchangeably write +'L1(p) and F'--l(k,y).
Given hlock cipher F as above, the block cipher FX : (0, 1}KE+2n
We interchangeably write FXjy(z) and FX(K,x).
Given a partially defined function F from a subset of {0,1}" to a subset of { O , 1)" wc denote thc domain and range of F by Dom(F) and Range(F), and define Dom(F) = (0, l}" -Dom(F) and R.ange(F) = (0, l}" -Range(F).
__
Let Fn denote the space of all (a")! permutations on 1%-bits. for a random key K of 6 + 2n. bits; ideal-encryption,-independent-of-F: the oracle computes n(.), for a random permutation 7r E 'PTt. The adversary's job is to guess which type of encryption oracle she has. The adversary's advantage is her probabilit,y of guessing right, normalized so that 0 indicates a worthless strategy and 1 indicates a perfect, stmtegy.
Definition2
. Let I C ,~ 2 0 he iiitegers, and let t 2 0 be a real number. Keysearch adversary A is said to €-break t,he FX-scheme with parameters R , 72 if
The above clefinit,ion iisw a very liberal riotion of adversarial success. We are not demanding tha.t,, say, A recover I<; nor do we ask A to decrypt a randoin FXK(S); nor to produce a not-yet-asked ( x , F X~~( x ) ) pair. Instead, we only ask A to make a good guess a t,o whether the (plaintext, ciphertext) pairs she has been receiving really are FX-encrypt,ions (as opposed to random nonsense unrelated to F ) . The liberal notion of success is chosen to make our main result stronger: an adversary's inability to succeed becomes all the more meaningful.
3
We now prove a bound on the security of FX agairist key-search attack. Proof. By a standard argument we may assume that A is deterministic (not,e that, A may be computationally unboiirided). Wc niay also assume that A always asks exactly m. queries of her first oracle, which we shall call her E-oracle. (In the experiment which defines A's advantage, E was instantiated by either an FXK-oracle or a 7r-oracle.) We may assume that, A always asks exactly t queries (total) to her second and third oracles, which we shall call her F-and F -' -oracles. We may further assume that A never repeats a query to an oracle. We may assume that if F ( k , z ) returns an answer y: then there is no query (neither earlier nor later) of F -' ( k , y ) . All of t,he above assumptions are without loss of generalit,y in the sense that> it, is easy to construct a new adversary, A', that obeys the above constraint,s and has thc same advantage a,s A.
We begin by considering two different gaincs which adversary A might, play.
This amounts to specifying how to simulate a triple of oracles, (E, F , F-'), for the benefit of A.
A FIRST GAME. The first game we consider, Game R (for 'ira~idom"), will exact)ly correspond to the experiment which defines the second addend in tjhe expression for the advantage:
Security of the DESX Construction
The definition of Game R will be defined to contain several extra (and seemingly irrelevant) steps. These steps aren't needed in order to behave in a manner which is identical (as far as A sees) to the Inanner of behavior defining Pn; these steps are used, instead, to facilitate our analysis. To identify these "irrelevant"
instructions we put them in italics. Game R is defined in Figure 1 . IfFG'(C @ k ; ) is defined, t h e n set bad. 3. Define E ( P ) = C and return C.
jFol On oracle query ~k ( a ) :
1. Choose y E ( 0 , l ) " uniformly from R.ange(Fk). 2. Zf k = k* and E ( z @I k;) is defined t h e n set bad.
. Define a ( z ) = y and return y .
Zf k = k* and E-'(y @ k ; ) as defined t h e n set bad. From the dcfinition of Game R we can see that:
Claim 3.1 PrR
A SECOND GAME. Now we define a. second game, Game x. It will exactly (:orrespond to the experinlent which defines t,he first term in the expression for the advantage:
Once again, the definihri of Game X will be defined t,o ront,ain some irrelevant^" instructions, which, for clarity, are indicated in italics. Game X is defined in Figure 2 .
The int,iiit,ion hehind Game .X is as follows. We try to behave like Game R, choosing a random (not-yet-provided) answer for each E ( P ) , and a random (notyet-provided for this k ) answer for each Fk(x), F'L1(y). Usually this works fine for getting behavior which looks like the experiment dcfining Px. But soinctimes it doesn't work, because an "iriconsistency" would be created between the FX-answers and the F/F-'-answers. Game X is vigilant in checking if any such inconsistencies are being created. If it finds an inconsistency about to be created, it changes the value which it had "warited" to answer in order to force consistency. Whenever Game S resorts to doing this it sets the flag bud. In the analysis, we "give up" (regard the adversary as having won) any time this happens.
Let P r x [.] denote the probability of the spwified event with respect, to Game X . The definition of Game X looks somewhat, further afield from the experiment which defines Px. Nonetheless, we claim the following: JEo( on oracle query E ( P ) :
1. Choose C E (0, l}" uniforrnly from Range(E).
2. If Fk* ( P (1) k y ) is defined, then C t Fk* ( P Q3 k ; ) @ k; and set bad.
Define E ( P )
= C and rctiirri C.
Else if FG'(C
-On oracle query ~k(z):
k ; ) is defined, then s e t bczd and goto Step 1.
1.
Choose y E {0,1}" uniformly from R,ange(Fk). Else if k = k* and E ( z @ k ; ) is dcfined then set bud and goto Step 1. 3. Define F k ( z ) = y and return z . 
Claim 3.2 P r x AE*E,F-'
The proof of this claim is in the appendix.
BOUNDING THE ADVANTAGE B Y PrR [BAD]
In nther Game R or Game x, let BAD be the event that, at some point in time, the flag bud gets set. Games R and X have been defined so as to coincide up until event BAD. That is, any circumstance that causes Game R arid Game X to execute different instructions will also cause both games to set bud. The following two clairris follow directly from this fact,. The argument is quite simple: we've just made woiild have caused bad to be set t,o true in Game R (where the choice was made a.t the beginning). The new game, Game R', is described in Figure 3 . From t,he definition of Game R' we see that: If 3 y such that FG1(y) and E -' ( y GI k i ) m e both, defined then set bad.
If 3 z such that Fb* (z) and E ( z k;) are both dt~fintd 6he71, set had.
Fig. 3. Game R'
The reason is as follows: for each defined ( F , E ( P ) ) , ( k , x , F k ( x ) ) t,here are a t most 2 '2'l points ( k ' , k ; , k z ) which induce a collision between these two points:
{y @ c}}. Now there arc only mt pairs of such points, so the total number of collision-inducing (k* , k; , k;) is as claimed.
Finally, in G a m e R' wc choose a triple (k', k:, k ; ) at random, independent of E and F , SO the chance that the selected triple is collision-inducing (for whatever E and F have been selected) is at most 217it. 2rL/2n+2n = m t . 2-n-n+1. Pulling everything together, this probability bounds i \ d v~, and we are done.
Discussion
HEALTH WARNINGS. We emphasize that when F is a concrete block cipher, not a random one, its internal structure can interact. with the FAX-construction in such a way as to obviate the construction's benefits. As a trivial example, if F already has the structure that it XORs plaintext and ciphertext with key material, then doing it uyain is certainly of no utility.
Our model considers how rnudi FXl.: (,) looks like a random permutation (when key K is random and unknown). It should be emphasized that some constructions which use block ciphers --particularly hash function constructionsassume something more of the underlying block cipher. The current results imply nothing about the suitability of FX in constructions which are not based on F X K ( . ) resembling a. rmdom permutation when K is random and unknown.
STRUCTURE IN T H E BLOCK CIPHER F WHIZN F = DES. Therc is one striictural
property of DES which has been suggested to assist, in brute-force attack: the DES key-complementation property. This property comprises a significant, sense in which DES is riot behaving like a family of (independent) random permutations. To "factor out" the key-complementation property just think of DES as having a single key bit fixed. Then one can conclude that if this is the only structural property of DES to be exploited by a key-search attack, DESX will CHOSEN-CIPHERIEXT (:K. The definition we used models a chosen-plaintext attack. One could easily allow, as [7] did, a chosen-ciphertext attack: simply provide A an oracle for FX-' (.), in addition t,o her oracle for FX (.) . In that case ni would count the sum of the number of queries to the FX and FX-' oracles, and Theorem 3 would continue to hold. The proof would change very little.
-is it OK to use the same key inside and out? In fact this does work, in the sense that Theorem 3 still goes through, the proof little changed.
NICER KEY LENGTHS. A minor inconvenience of DESX is its strange key size.
In applications it would sometimes be preferable t,o ext,end the definition of DESX to use arbitrary-length keys, or else to use keys of some fixed but more convenient length. Standard key-separation techniques can be used. For example, when IKI # 184, we might define DESXK(X) to be equal to D E S X K~(~) where K' is dcfincd as follows:
still limit the at,tack's advantage t,o trn . 2--55-64-t1 --trn. 2-118. If
.64, and
Here, SHA-1 is the map of the NIST Secure Hash Standard, X I ...p denotes the first l bits of X , and C, C1 and C2 are distinct,, equal-length strings that are part of the DESX specification.
DIFFERENTIAL AND LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS. OPERATIONS BESIDES XOR. w e emphasize that the DESX construction w a never intended t o add strength against differential or linear cryptanalysis. The attacks of [2, 101 do not represent a threat against DES when the cipher is prudently employed (e.g., when a re-key is forced before an inordinate amount of text has been acted on), so we were content that the DESX construction does not render differential or linear attack any easier. Nonetheless, the proof of Theorem 3 goes through when G? is replaced by a variety of other operations, and some of these alternatives may help to defeat attacks which were not addressed by our model, including differential and linear cryptanalysis. In particular, an attractive ;tlternat,ive to DESX may be the construction DESPk.kl,kz(z) = k2 
Our Bound is Tight
We have shown that the adversary's advantage is at most t . 2-n-n+1+'gm. We now show that for a wide rangc of m (comprising all m that would be considered in practice), an attacker can, with probability very close to t . 2-K-7a-4f1g (the exact bound is Section 5 . 3 ) , recover a key K = k.kl.k2 that is consistent with the encryptions under FX of m plaintexts chosen before any oracle queries are made. For reasonable values of m, this at, least as strong as simply distinguishing FX from a purely random permutation, To motivate our attack, we can view the FX block cipher as choosing a random key k and then applying the Even-Mansour construction t o the function Fk. We can t,herefore adapt Daemen's chosen plaintext attack [5] on the Even-Mansour construction [7] . Unfortunately, we don't know the value of k , so we instead try all possible ones. For completeness, we describe the attack and calculate the amount of work required to have probability t of recovering the key.
Preliminaries
Assiime that rrb is even, m 5 2q1, and f < i. Fix a constant, C E {0,1}" -{On).
For any function G, define G"(z) = G(z CD C) ~3 3 G(z). Given an oracle for G one can compute Gn by making two c:alls. Let the secret key K = k . k l . k 2 . Let E by a synonym for F X . By our definitions and simple algebra we have
The basic attack
The attacker chooses x l , . . . , x,p E ( 0 , l}" such that q,. . . , zrr+, 2 1 &, C , . . . , such that F E ( r i ) = E $ ( z j ) . At this point, the attacker hopes that k' = k and r is equal to either xJ fB kl or z3 fB C CB k l . If so, then k l must be either xj Cl3 ri 
A Proof of Claim3.2
We first define a new game, denoted Game X', which matches more directly thr definition of the experiment defining Px. G a m r X ' is defined in Figure 4 . A basic difference between Games X and X' is tha.t Game X separately defines both E and F p while Game X' only defines F p and computes E ( P ) , in response to a query P , by F p ( P @ k ; ) @ k;. Thc essence of oiir argument) is that Game X can also be viewed as answering its E ( P ) queries by referring to F p . But, strictly speaking, it's riot really Fk* which can be consulted. We get, around this as follows. 2. Else, choose y € (0,1}" uniformly from Range(Fk), define F k ( 2 ) = y and ~~~~~r~i l e query F i l (y):
1. IfFi-'(y) is defined, return F;l(y). 2. Else, choose z E ( 0 , I}" uniformly from Dom(Fk), define F k ( z ) = y and return ___ 2.
Fig. 4. Game X '
Thus, in executing Game X , defining a value for E or F p can implicitly define a new value for F p .
At face value, the above definition might bc inconsistent-this could happen if both F p (z) and E ( x @ k:) are defined for some z, arid with "clashing" values (ie., values which do not differ by kg). Before we proceed, we observe that this can never happen:
Claim A . l Let E 2nd Fk. be partial functions which may arise in in Game X .
Then the function F p , as described above, is well-defined.
The proof is by induction on the number of "Define" steps (Steps E-3, F-3, or F-l-3) in the definition of Game X , where points of F k * become defined as Game X executes. The basis (when E and F-' are completely undefined) is trivial. So suppose that, in step E-3, we set E ( P ) = C. Is it possible that this definition of E ( P ) will cause p k , to become ill-defined? The only potential conflict is between the new E ( P ) value and a value already selected for Fp (P 63 k; The function Fk*, as defincd for Game X , also makes sense for G~I I E X', where Fk-(z) = Fk* (z). Our strategy, then, is to explain the effect of each E ( . ) , Fk* (.), and FG1(.) query strictly in terms of F A * , We then observe that Game X' responds to its oracle queries in an absolutelg identical way. This suffices to show the games equivalent. 
